Why it is wrong to bet on the euro's demise

From The Business Insider: ".. When it comes to the PIIGS, Dr. Doom (Nouriel Roubini) is in full-on doom mode. Nouriel, of course, takes that kind of thinking to its logical conclusion, and kicked off the panel by announcing that it was just in time: “in a few days,” he said, “there might not be a eurozone for us to discuss.” There's no way that Greece can implement the 10% spending cut it needs to do in order to stop its debt spiralling out of control at current interest rates — and even if it did, the economic effects would be disastrous. Nouriel's base case, then, is Argentina 2001: after all, Greece has a much higher debt-to-GDP ratio, much higher deficit-to-GDP ratio, and much higher current-account deficit than Argentina had back then. And if that's the base case, there's no way that Greek debt should be trading anywhere near its current levels.
And guess what: Spain is worse than Greece, says Roubini. Ugh..."
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Comment: I don't know why Roubini says such silly things. If he really believes in what he is saying, better call him "Mr. silly Doom" instead of "Dr. Doom".
Sometimes I get the impression that in order to become a popular economist in the US, like Krugman or Roubini or Stiglitz, for example, one has to maintain a rate of 80 to 90 per cent of silly things to say and keep the sound part of one's uttering down at a rate from 10 to 20 per cent. In order to become prominent in the US as an economist follow the rule: the more clattering, the better.
As to the European Monetary Union, almost all prominent US commentators, beginning with Friedman and Feldstein, have been wrong and the same will hold for the current euro doom sayers. The euro is a political project. It is a means, not the end. The aim of creating a unified Europe still stands and there are few governments in the region that doubt it. Therefore, there will be a bailout of Greece. For me this has been certain from the beginning of the crisis. Uncertainty and hesitation have irritated the financial markets, but a swift compromise would have reduced the chances of Greece (and much of the rest of the PIIGS) to seriously address their fiscal problems. The hesitation in Berlin was also necessary because otherwise the popular resistance against austerity measures in countries like Greece and Portugal would have remained too high for the governments to carry out their plans. As of now the Greek drama hasn't cost the German or French taxpayer a cent, and although the rates have risen for Greek debt, the Greek government hasn't yet needed to pay the risk premium. As of now, the cost of the Greek drama has fully fallen back on the financial market itself, i.e. on the holders of Greek titles. If these holders did not sell, they may expect a full recovery of the price of their bonds until maturity.